Description

In this final video of the series, Professor Vanden Bergh will explore a more complex policy making process where multiple political institutions interact to determine policy. In particular, he will analyze regulatory policy decisions in a context where elected politicians can overturn their decisions. He concludes by discussing the implications of this model for political strategy.

References

Vanden Bergh, R. G., & Holburn, G. L. (2007). Targeting corporate political strategy: Theory and evidence from the US accounting industry. Business and Politics, 9(2), 1-31.

Bonardi, J. P., Holburn, G. L., & Vanden Bergh, R. G. (2006). Nonmarket strategy performance: Evidence from US electric utilities. Academy of Management Journal, 49(6), 1209-1228.

Holburn, G. L., & Vanden Bergh, R. G. (2000). Policy and process: A game-theoretic framework for the design of non-market strategy. In The New Institutionalism in Strategic Management (pp. 33-66). Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

Holburn, G. L., & Vanden Bergh, R. G. (2004). Influencing agencies through pivotal political institutions. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 20(2), 458-483.

Holburn, G. L., & Vanden Bergh, R. G. (2008). Making friends in hostile environments: Political strategy in regulated industries. Academy of Management Review, 33(2), 521-540.