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Ostrom and Coase's Criticisms to Standard Approaches

Description

In this video, Gary Libecap, Distinguished Professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara, discusses the approaches of Elinor Ostrom and Ronald Coase on dealing with resource allocation. He explains the reasoning behind Coase's principle of having the beneficiary and not the polluter paying as a solution to environmental problems. He also discussed Coasean bargaining and the issues with the initial distribution of property rights.

References

Coase, R. H. “The Problem of Social Cost.” The Journal of Law & Economics, vol. 3, 1960, pp. 1–44. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/724810.

Ostrom, Elinor (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521405997.

Gary Libecap, Distinguished Professor, Bren School of Environmental Science and Management and Economics Department, University of California, Santa Barbara

Gary is Professor of Corporate Environmental Management and Economics at the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB). His research focuses on the legal, economic, and policy aspects of freshwater allocation and wild ocean fisheries management. (read more ...)